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STATUTORY RAPE IN A POST LAWRENCE
v. TEXAS WORLD
Arnold H. Loewy*
AWRENCE v. Texas1 has spawned many different perspectives.
To some, it is virtually the Magna Charta for the homosexual com-
munity.2 To others it is the resurgence of the salutary concept of
liberty.3 To still others, it is the embodiment of a meaningful Establish-
ment Clause.4 But what has not yet been analyzed is the creation (or
reaffirmation) of an adult's constitutional right to engage in heterosexual
sex in the privacy of his home.
It is the first contention of this article that such a right does now exist.
Second, I contend that the existence of such a right impacts on the law of
statutory rape in at least two ways. At a minimum, it should provide a
constitutional defense for an individual who engages in sexual intercourse
with a person that he non-negligently believes is an adult. Beyond that, it
is at least plausible that the constitutional right to be sexually active ex-
tends to some people under age eighteen. This article will explore these
questions.
I. IS THERE A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
HETEROSEXUAL INTERCOURSE BETWEEN
UNMARRIED PARTNERS?
Pre-Lawrence, it was certainly arguable that there was a constitutional
right for unmarried partners to engage in heterosexual sex as some, but
not all, lower courts had held.5 I limit this discussion to unmarried part-
* Arnold H. Loewy is Graham Kenan Professor of Law at the University of North
Carolina School of Law. The author would like to thank William Cross for his research
assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
2. See, e.g., David B. Zucco, Symposium: Gay Rights After Lawrence v. Texas, 88
MINN. L. REV. 1017 (2004).
3. See Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 429, 493-94 (2004).
4. See Arnold H. Loewy, Morals Legislation and the Establishment Clause, 55 ALA.
L. REV. 159, 181-82 (2003).
5. See, e.g., State v. Saunders, 381 A.2d 333 (N.J. 1977); Purvis v. State, 377 So. 2d 674
(Fla. 1979); Doe v. Duling, 603 F. Supp. 960 (E.D. Va. 1985), vacated by 782 F.2d 1202 (4th
Cir. 1986) (finding no case or controversy and, thus, not reaching constitutional issues
where numerous courts had suggested that the right to privacy included the right to unmar-
ried fornication and, even in some cases, adultery); cf. Martin J. Siegel, For Better or Worse:
Adultery, Crime & the Constitution, 30 J. FAM. L. 45 (1991-1992). But see Commonwealth
v. Stowell, 449 N.E.2d 357 (Mass. 1983) (rejecting such a right).
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ners because of the potential spouse victimization in an adultery situa-
tion6 that is not present in regard to fornication.
It is tempting to simply cite Lawrence for the proposition that consen-
sual, heterosexual penile-vaginal sexual intercourse in the privacy of
one's home is constitutionally protected. And, I do indeed reach that
conclusion. Before reaching it, however, I reread Lawrence from the per-
spective of a prosecutor hoping to prosecute a case of fornication.
Imagine a fact pattern virtually identical to Lawrence, except that John,
instead of engaging in consensual anal intercourse with Tyrone, 7 engages
in consensual vaginal intercourse with Tonya. In both cases, the police
search which discovered the activity is lawful. In the hypothetical, we
will, of course, assume that fornication is unlawful, 8 and that an isolated
act of sexual intercourse constitutes the crime. 9
Our hypothetical prosecutor would like to argue that Lawrence only
involved homosexual conduct. He might also argue that homosexuals
may be akin to a discrete and insular minority.' 0 Consequently, he might
contend that heterosexuals have full access to the electorate and need no
special coddling from the courts.'1
The problem with this argument is that the decision in Lawrence relied
on no such basis. Indeed, Lawrence specifically critiqued the earlier
Bowers v. Hardwick opinion 12 for suggesting that the case was about the
6. Cf. Loewy, supra note 4, at 165-166 (discussing the "'special contract" of marriage
and the harm done by breaching that contract through adultery).
7. The parties in Lawrence were John Lawrence (the home owner) and Tyrone Gar-
ner, his guest.
8. As it is in fourteen states. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 798.02 (West 2004); IDAlO CODE§ 18-6603 (Michie 2004); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/11-8 (West 2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 272, § 18 (West 2004); Micti. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.335 (West 2004); MINN.STAT. ANN. § 609.34 (West 2004); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-29-1 (2004); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 14-186 (2004); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-10 (2004); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1120(West 2004); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-60 (Law Co-op. 2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-104(2004); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-344 to 12-345 (Michie 2004); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-8-3(Michie 2004). The Federal government also bans fornication. See 18 U.S.C. § 2421
(2004).
9. This is not universally true, even in jurisdictions that punish fornication. Some
such jurisdictions require an "open and notorious" living together. See, e.g., 720 ILL.COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/11-8 (West 2004). See also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (2004) (requir-ing the couple to "'lewdly and lasciviously associate, bed and cohabit together").
10. Beginning in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938),
the Supreme Court has suggested that such minority groups can lay a special claim tojudicial protection because they are unable to defend themselves through the democratic
process based on their small numbers and disfavored place in society. Indeed, in reference
to homosexuals, Justice Scalia seems to have inadvertently made exactly this point in Law-
rence by pointing out the long history of persistent discrimination. "Many Americans do
not want persons who openly engage in homosexual conduct as partners in their business,
as scoutmasters for their children, as teachers in their children's schools, or as boarders intheir home. They view this as protecting themselves and their families from a lifestyle that
they believe to be immoral and destructive." Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (2003)(Scalia, J., dissenting). See also Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 192-94 (1986) (discuss-ing the longstanding social disapproval of homosexuals and homosexual practices).
It. Cf. JOtIN HART ELY, DEMOCIRACY AND DISTRUST: A T-l-Oi.Y OFC JUI)ICIAL RE-
VIEW 135 (1980).
12. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566.
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fundamental right of homosexuals to commit sodomy.' 3 Rather, the
Court thought that the issue concerned the right to regulate private sex-
ual behavior between consenting adults in the privacy of one's home.'
4
Indeed, the Court eschewed reliance on a readily available equal pro-
tection rationale, predicated on Texas' unwillingness to apply the law to
heterosexual couples.' 5 It predicated its unwillingness to rely on equal
protection on its concern that states might be willing to also forbid heter-
osexual sodomy: "Were we to hold the statute invalid under the Equal
Protection Clause some might question whether a prohibition would be
valid if drawn differently, say, to prohibit the conduct both between
same-sex and different-sex participants."' 6
So, the Court seems to be saying that criminalizing penile-anal sex be-
tween John and Tonya would not justify criminalizing penile-anal sex be-
tween John and Tyrone. Rather, it is protected in both cases. So, if
Lawrence is clearly holding that penile-anal sex between John and Tonya
is protected, could it conceivably be argued that penile-vaginal sex be-
tween them is not? Not unless non-procreative sex stands in a constitu-
tionally superior position to procreative sex, a position that I can not
imagine any court would endorse.' 7
There is one other argument that our hypothetical prosecutor might
attempt. He might argue that John and Tonya have a constitutionally
acceptable way to exercise their fundamental right to sexual intimacy:
they could marry. That option was not available to John and Tyrone.
At least one prior case supports this argument. In Zablocki v.
Redhail,'8 where the Court upheld the fundamental character of the right
to marry, part of the Court's reasoning was: "[I]f appellee's right to pro-
create means anything at all, it must imply some right to enter the only
relationship in which the State of Wisconsin allows sexual relations le-
gally to take place."'19 The Court then dropped a footnote quoting Wis-
consin's fornication law seemingly with approval. 20
If Lawrence had not explicitly rejected this suggestion, plausibly the
Zablocki dictum could prevail. However, Lawrence did explicitly reject
13. Id. at 567 (chastising the Bowers Court's "'failure to appreciate the extent of the
liberty at stake. To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain
sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a
married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual
intercourse.").
14. Id.
15. A rationale that appealed to concurring Justice O'Connor. See id. at 579-85.
16. Id. at 575.
17. 1 suppose that one could argue that procreative sex runs the risk of unwanted
offspring, a societal concern not present in non-procreative sex. Notwithstanding this con-
cern, no Justice has ever even hinted that non-procreative sex stands in a constitutionally
superior position to procreative sex.
18. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
19. Id. at 386.
20. See id. at n.l ("Wisconsin punishes fornication as a criminal offense: Whoever has
sexual intercourse with a person not his spouse may be fined not more than $200 or impris-
oned not more than 6 months or both."). Wis. STAT' § 944.15 (1973).
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it.21 In rejecting the earlier Bowers decision, the Court explicitly quoted
with approval from Justice Stevens' Bowers dissent, noting: "[I]ndividual
decisions by married persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical
relationship, even when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of
'liberty' protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Moreover this protection extends to intimate choices by unmarried
as well as married persons."22
With language this clear, it seems impossible to seriously maintain that
for good or ill, the constitutional right of unmarried adults to engage in
penile-vaginal intercourse in the privacy of their homes does not exist.
Consequently, the remainder of this article will be predicated on the exis-
tence of that right.
II. CAN A STATUTORY RAPE CONVICTION EVER
BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL?
Lawrence could not have been clearer in emphasizing that it was con-
sidering the constitutional rights of adults only. 23 Consequently, one ar-
guing that Lawrence has something to say about statutory rape, which by
definition applies only to an under eighteen or younger sex participant,2 4
clearly has the burden of proof. In this section, I shall discuss a hypothet-
ical case in which a constitutional defense to a statutory rape prosecution
would be appropriate.
Assume the following: Arthur Brown and Elizabeth Jones are both stu-
dents at a university in Florida. Arthur, a graduate student, and Eliza-
beth, a sophomore, meet at a beginning of the school year party
sponsored by the English Department for students with an especial inter-
est in Shakespeare. Upon their meeting, Arthur and Elizabeth spend al-
most the entire party together. Arthur is amazed that Elizabeth, despite
being only a sophomore, is more steeped in the intricacies of Shakespeare
than most of his fellow graduate students.
As the party ends at 8:00 p.m., Elizabeth invites Arthur to join her for
dinner at her apartment. Because Arthur lives on campus and does not
have a car, Elizabeth drives him to her apartment, five miles away. At
about 11:00 p.m., after a lovely dinner and an extended discussion of the
21. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565.
22. 1d. at 578 (emphasis added) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 188, 216 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting)).
23. Id. at 578 ("The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons
who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might
not easily be refused .... The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual
consent from each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle.").
24. There have been times in our nation's history when the age was as high as twenty-
one, but currently, no state has an age limit higher than eighteen and only six place the age
even that high. See Aiuz. REv. STAr. ANN. § 13-1405 (West 2004); CAL. PE NAL CoIE§ 261.5 (West 2004); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 794.05 (West 2004); IDAHO CODEt § 18-6101(Michie 2004); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-20-01 to 1-20-08.1 (2002); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 39-13-506 (2004). For a full, state-by-state list of the varying ages of consent and how
they have changed over the last century see CAROLYN E. COCCA, JAILBAlT: TiIF PoLiriCs
OF STATUTrORY RAI't' LAws IN TH UNITED STA'ES 23-24 (2004).
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various nuances of Romeo and Juliet, Arthur asks Elizabeth to drive him
home. Elizabeth responds by noting the dangerous thunderstorm outside
and invites Arthur to spend the night.
At midnight, while Arthur and Elizabeth are engaged in sexual inter-
course initiated by Elizabeth, Elizabeth's mother, Colleen Jones, who has
a key to Elizabeth's apartment, unlocks the front door and enters the
bedroom to tell Elizabeth that her father was in an auto accident from
driving in the thunderstorm. While the three are at the hospital visiting
Elizabeth's father, Colleen ascertains that Arthur is twenty-four years
old. She then informs him that because Elizabeth is only seventeen years
and ten months old, he could technically be prosecuted as a felon for
engaging sexual intercourse with Elizabeth. 25 Donna Roberts, the local
District Attorney who happens to be standing next to Arthur and Col-
leen, overhears the conversation and exclaims: "There is nothing techni-
cal about it! I prosecute statutory rape whenever I discover it."
At Arthur's trial, Elizabeth testifies for the defense, stating that the sex
was not only consensual, but that she had initiated it. Arthur testifies that
it never occurred to him that Elizabeth might be under eighteen. The
average age for sophomores at the University is nineteen or twenty, and
Elizabeth seemed considerably more mature than the average sopho-
more. Nevertheless, Arthur is convicted by the jury on instructions from
the trial judge that the elements of the crime include intercourse between
the parties, the victim's age being sixteen or seventeen, and the defen-
dant's being at least twenty-four years of age.
26
Because of the extenuating circumstances of the case, the judge
sentences Arthur to time served (the three months he spent in jail, pend-
ing trial), three years probation, and two hundred hours of community
service.2 7 He also notifies Arthur that he will be required to register as a
sex offender in any jurisdiction that has such a requirement. Arthur pre-
serves all constitutional objections and ultimately petitions to the United
States Supreme Court, which grants certiorari.
What arguments might Arthur have and how should the Court resolve
them? One argument is that Elizabeth has a constitutional right to pri-
vacy which was breached by the arrest and conviction of Arthur. The
other is that Arthur non-negligently (i.e. reasonably) believed that he was
exercising a constitutional right under Lawrence.
There is no doubt that the Florida statute limits Elizabeth's privacy
rights in a very significant way. First of all, her sexual exploits are publi-
cized. Even though the Florida reporter will refer to her as E. J.,28 the
25. See FLA. STAr. ANN. § 794.05.
26. See Griffin v. State, 3202 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1975) (citing Lowe v. State, 19 So. 2d 106
(Fla. 1944)).
27. Cf. Owens v. State, 724 A.2d 43, 45 (Md. 1999) (sentencing Timothy Owens to
eighteen months of prison (all but the time served suspended) and eighteen months of
probation).
28. See FLA. STrA. ANN. § 794.03 (West 2004) (making it unlawful to make public the
name, address or other "'identifying fact" about the victim of any sexual offense).
2005]
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public trial, airing her private linen, as well as jailing a treasured friend
for accommodating her desires, cannot be pleasant. Moreover, to the ex-
tent that others can be prosecuted for satisfying her private sexual
desires, her right to obtain such satisfaction is obviously diminished.
In the Supreme Court's one major statutory rape case, the Court was
remarkably myopic in its inability or unwillingness to see the question
from the perspective of the "victim's" autonomy rights.29 In that case,
Michael M. v. Superior Court, the Court upheld a California law that pe-
nalized consensual penile-vaginal sex with a female under eighteen. 30
Consequently, only underage females could be victims, and only males,
including underage males, could be perpetrators. 3'
As the Court saw the case, there was no issue in regard to discrimina-
tion against young women, who were not permitted to experience sex at
the same age as their brothers. 32 Rather, the Court was so clear that the
issue was exclusively discrimination against men, that the plurality actu-
ally concluded, contrary to the Court's prior 33 and subsequent 34 jurispru-
dence, that because this case involved only discrimination against males,
there was no need of "special solicitude of the courts. ' 35
This approach should be contrasted to that taken in Craig v. Boren,36
where the Court analyzed a law precluding young men from purchasing
certain beer until age twenty-one, while young women could purchase the
same beer at age eighteen, as discrimination against men. 37 So, in the
Court's mind, when young women are permitted to buy beer at an earlier
age than their brothers, the young men are the discriminated-against
class. 38 But, when young men are permitted to have sex at an earlier age
than their sisters, it is they, rather than their sisters, who are the discrimi-
nated-against class.
To be sure, the challenge to the sex/age discrimination was brought by
Michael M., a young man who was convicted because his partner was
under eighteen. 39 But the beer/age discrimination case was brought by a
beer vendor, who happened to be a woman.40 Indeed, like California's
statutory rape law at issue in Michael M.,41 the underaged, beer buyer
could not be prosecuted, only the vendor. Yet that did not preclude the
Court from understanding that the right involved was that of the under-
29. Michael M. v. Sonoma County Super. Ct., 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
30. Id. at 476.
31. Id. at 466.
32. Id. at 475.
33. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
34. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
35. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 476.
36. Craig, 429 U.S. at 190.
37. Id. at 191-92.
38. Id. at 192.
39. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 466.
40. The named plaintiff, Craig, was a man. But his standing was in question because
he had reached twenty-one by the time the Court decided the case. His co-plaintiff, Whit-
ener, however, was a female beer vendor, who the Court thought clearly had standing.
41. Michael M., 450 U.S. at 466.
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aged beer buyer.42
As between the two rights, it is clear that the right to sexual privacy is
far more fundamental. The Supreme Court has never so much as hinted
that the right to ingest whatever substance one chooses is constitutionally
protected.43 The right involved in Michael M., however, clearly would
have been protected had the parties been a little bit older.44
Notwithstanding Michael M., it should be clear that Arthur has stand-
ing to raise Elizabeth's right to sexual privacy. Because he is facing a
criminal conviction for assisting Elizabeth in the exercise of her claimed
constitutional right, his case for standing is at least as strong as the birth
control director in Griswold v. Connecticut,45 or the contraceptive distrib-
utor in Eisenstadt v. Baird,46 and considerably stronger than the beer ven-
42. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 192 (1976).
43. Most obviously, the Supreme Court has made it crystal clear that many narcotics
can be constitutionally regulated. See, e.g., Minnesota ex rel. Whipple v. Martinson, 256
U.S. 41, 45 (1921) ("There can be no question of the authority of the state in the exercise of
its police power to regulate the administration, sale, prescription and use of dangerous and
habit-forming drugs, such as are named in the statute. The right to exercise this power is so
manifest in the interest of the public health and welfare, that it is unnecessary to enter
upon a discussion of it beyond saying that it is too firmly established to be successfully
called in question."). See also Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 597-98 (1977). State courts
have also made it clear that such prohibitions are permissible. See, e.g., State v. Rippley,
319 N.W.2d 129, 133 (N.D. 1982) ("We find it difficult to conceive of any offense which so
adversely affects public welfare and interest as the wrongful sale of narcotic drugs. This
unquestionably justifies a State, in the exercise of its police power, to prohibit [the posses-
sion] thereof, . . .and to place on all persons the responsibility to see that they do not
[possess] drugs unlawfully." (quoting State v. Gordon, 586 S.W.2d 811, 817 (Mo. Ct. App.
1976) (internal citation omitted)). Further, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) has
tremendously broad discretion to control any product that is "ingested, inhaled, implanted,
or otherwise used in close contact with the human body." See Nicotine in Cigarettes and
Smokeless Tobacco Is a Drug and These Products Are Nicotine Delivery Devices Under
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act: Jurisdictional Determination, 61 Fed. Reg.
44,619 (Aug. 28, 1996) at 44,628. But see Ravin v. State. 537 P.2d 494, 502 (Alaska 1975)
(finding that possession and use of marijuana in the home was a privacy right that the state
had no adequate justification for abridging).
44. At least in a post-Lawrence world. At the time Michael M. was decided, the ques-
tion was more debatable. Certainly, many scholars have argued for years that the right to
privacy must encompass such sexual autonomy. See, e.g., David R. Richards, Commercial
Sex and the Rights of the Person: A Moral Argument for the Decriminalization of Prostitu-
tion, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1195, 1271-79 (1979) (arguing that sexual autonomy is a "human
right" that may not be constitutionally abridged except where a compelling state interest
requires), and Note, Constitutional Barriers to Criminal and Civil Pre- and Extra-Marital
Sex, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1660, 1660 (1991) (arguing that "consensual heterosexual inter-
course is a constitutionally protected activity, immune from governmental regulation ab-
sent reasons compelling enough to justify the invasion of the most private matters").
However, others have argued that the important state interests involved require significant
limitations. Indeed, there are several points of dicta from the Supreme Court suggesting
that fornication and adultery were not understood to be protected before Lawrence. See,
e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 498 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (noting
that it was "beyond doubt" that fornication and adultery laws were constitutionally permis-
sible). See also Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 553 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing for
the rights of married couples to use contraceptives, noted that, in his view, adultery, homo-
sexuality, fornication, and incest should not be protected, even in the privacy of the home.
45. Griswold, 381 U.S. 480-81.
46. 405 U.S. 438, 443-46 (1972).
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dor in Craig, who had not yet even been prosecuted. 47
A. ELIZABETH'S CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM
The only certain rules in regard to juveniles' constitutional rights are
(1) they have them, 48 (2) they are not necessarily coextensive with adult
rights 49 and (3) they expand as the child approaches adulthood.5 °
The first question involves the ascertainment of adulthood. It would
seem hard to make the case for the age being older than eighteen. Not-
withstanding rules concerning alcohol, virtually every adult right and re-
sponsibility is now available at eighteen. In regard to sex, no state has a
higher age of consent than eighteen. Consequently, it seems clear that
had Elizabeth been two months older at the time of her encounter with
Arthur, they would have been protected under Lawrence.5 1
It is possible that the right to sexual activity might attach prior to eigh-
teen, although Lawrence said nothing to so indicate. 52 Two obvious ana-
logues are the abortion 53 and contraceptive 54 cases. If Elizabeth desired
an abortion, it seems quite clear that she would have been able to obtain
one .
55
Similarly, if she had desired to purchase a contraceptive product, she
also would have had that right.56 Is there any good reason to distinguish
sexual activity?
47. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 192 (1976).
48. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503, 506-07 (1969).
49. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 603, 687 (1986).
50. Recognized by courts at every level and in areas of the law from Miranda warnings
(Yarborough v. Alvarado. 541 U.S. 652, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2152 (2004) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) ("[Older adolescents] vary widely in their reactions to police questioning, and many
can be expected to behave as adults")) to abortion rights (Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622,
633 (1979) (stressing the requirement for "'sensitivity and flexibility to the special needs of
... children")) to the right to refuse medical treatment (In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 325 (I11.
1989) (agreeing that the age of majority "is not an impenetrable barrier that magically
precludes a minor from possessing and exercising certain rights normally associated with
adulthood").
51. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578-79 (2003).
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Bel-
lotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979); but see Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S.
502 (990).
54. See Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
55. Ever since Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, supra note 53, a minor, old enough to
become pregnant, has had a constitutional right to an abortion. While the precise parame-
ters of the right in regard to parental notification have been a little fuzzy (see, e.g., H.L. v.
Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981)), there is little doubt that a seventeen and ten month old
college sophomore with her own apartment has an unfettered constitutional right to obtain
an abortion.
56. In Carey, supra note 54, the Supreme Court overturned a New York statute that,
among other things, prohibited distribution of contraceptives to anyone under sixteen. Jus-
tice Brennan, for the Court, made it clear that "the right to privacy, in connection with
decisions affecting procreation, extends to minors as well as to adults" and, in light of the
rights of minors to terminate pregnancy, "the constitutionality of a blanket prohibition of
the distribution of contraceptives to minors is afortiori foreclosed." Carey, 431 U.S. at 693.
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In regard to the abortion cases, one can argue that there is no time for
postponement to a later age. The underaged girl is pregnant now. If she
waits until adulthood, it will be too late to exercise her right to not pro-
create. Given the fundamental character of the right of non-procreation,
coupled with the social disutility of forcing a child upon a child who is
clearly unwilling and probably unable to assume that responsibility, the
abortion cases could be seen as almost sui generis. Put differently, her
right to abortion must be exercised now or not at all. Her right to sexual-
ity, on the other hand, can be postponed if the law in its wisdom deems
that to be appropriate.
Distinguishing the right to contraception is not so easy. If sexual activ-
ity can wait, so can contraceptive use. Indeed, it is difficult to know why
one would want a contraceptive if she did not contemplate sexual inter-
course. Nevertheless, the Court has offered a plausible distinction.5 7 The
State may prohibit teenage sexual intercourse, but nevertheless must not
prohibit contraceptives, thereby making the illegal intercourse extra haz-
ardous. 58 As Justice Stevens put it in his concurring opinion in Carey: "It
is as though a state decided to dramatize its disapproval of motorcycles by
forbidding the use of safety helmets. ' 59 Though, frankly, I am not over-
whelmed by that logic, 60 it convinces me that the Court, at least at the
time of the Carey case, did not intend to constitutionalize the right of
minors to be sexually active.6 1 Of course, at that time, it was not clear
that adults had a constitutional right to engage in sexual intercourse ei-
ther.62 Now that they do, it seems prudent to examine that right from the
perspective of minors afresh.
57. Id. at 694-99.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 715.
60. Governments frequently take what seem Draconian measures to indicate their dis-
approval of certain behavior. Most governments punish medicinal use of marijuana even
where the benefits clearly outweigh the harm. See, e.g., State v. Tate, 505 A.2d 941 (N.J.
1986). Similarly, a common argument against government-supplied clean needles is that
their availability will encourage more drug use. By that reasoning, I could well imagine a
government that forbade juveniles from riding (even as passengers) on motorcycles from
purchasing motorcycle helmets lest they be tempted to ride them. More to the point, that
same government might prohibit juveniles from contraceptive devices because with them,
they would be more likely to engage in sexual intercourse. Indeed, several states have
statutorily mandated abstinence-only education in public schools. See, e.g., N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 115C-81(el)(6) (2001); 105 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/27-9.1(b) (West 2000); ARIZ.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 15-716 (West 2004).
61. See also Michael M., 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (holding by at least six justices that says
basically the same thing). Justice Rehnquist (joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Powell) writing for the plurality made it clear "that a State may regulate the sexual behav-
ior of minors." Id. at 473 n.8 (citing Carey, 431 U.S. at 694 n.17). Concurring with the
plurality, Justice Stewart (id. at 476) and Justice Blackmun (id. at 481) were also unper-
suaded that a minor's constitutional privacy rights might encompass sexual activity. Even
Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion expressly stated that "[als a matter of constitutional
power . . . [he had] no doubt about the validity of a state law prohibiting all unmarried
teenagers from engaging in sexual intercourse." Id. at 497.
62. See similar reasoning in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) which overturned
a statue limiting single peoples' access to contraception based on equal protection grounds,
rather than on a fundamental right to sexual intercourse. See also supra note 44.
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One method that the Court typically employs is to look at the rule of
the various jurisdictions. 63 A slight majority of the states put no sexual
limitations on seventeen or sixteen year olds. 64 In those states, sixteen
and seventeen year olds are functionally treated as adults insofar as their
private sexual experiences are concerned. 65 Most of the states that limit
the sexuality of seventeen or sixteen year olds, including Florida, only
limit their power to have sex with individuals substantially older than
themselves. 6 6 Consequently, a perusal of states might suggest that sixteen
ought to be the constitutional age of consent.
Buttressing this conclusion is the fact that more than half of America's
teenagers have experienced at least one act of voluntary sexual inter-
course before age seventeen. 6 7 Furthermore, substantial numbers of doc-
tors and other health professionals believe that this is a healthy part of an
older adolescent's development into adulthood. 6 Given the almost rev-
erential respect to which Roe v. Wade69 held medical opinions, this point
is not without relevance.
Of course, Florida could argue that it does permit Elizabeth to be sexu-
ally active. It merely requires that she choose a partner twenty-three
years old or younger. It could further argue that the overwhelming ma-
jority of the voluntary sexual activity just described involves individuals
no more than five years older than the teenager. 70 Furthermore, to the
extent health professionals support such activity, it is with somebody in
63. See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558-59. Cf. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)(concluding that executing mentally retarded people had become "cruel and unusual"
based on the "evolving standards of decency" of the United States as evidenced by numer-
ous changes among state laws on the subject).
64. All but six place their age of consent below 18. See supra note 22, at 23-24, and of
the remaining forty-four, only thirteen so limit the sexual freedoms of sixteen year olds
(ALA. CODE § 13A-6-62 (1975); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-402 (1977); CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 53a-71(a)(1) (2003); HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-730 (2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3504(1969); MINN. STAT. § 609.342 (1975); Mo. REV. STAT. § 566.034 (1995); N.J. SrAT. ANN.§ 2C:14-2 (West 1979); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 130.25 (McKinney 1965); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2907.04 (Anderson 2000); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3121 (West 1995); S.D. CODI-
FIED LAWS § 202-202-1 (Michie 1939); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 202.011 (Vernon 1983)).
65. Id.
66. Only four states, Arizona, California, Idaho, and Massachusetts do not so limit the
definition of statutory rape, and even among those, two states (Arizona and California)
offer reduced sentences for defendants who are of similar age to their "victims." See ARIz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1405 (West 2004); CAL. PENAL CODE STAT. § 261.05 (West 2004);
IDAHO CODE § 18-6101 (Michie 2004); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 272 § 4 (West 2004).
67. See 75% of 19-Year-Old Women Have Had Sex, Study Finds, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 6,
1991, at 8, col. 2 (reporting that over 25% of fifteen-year old women and over 50% of
seventeen-year old women have had consensual premarital sex). Further, the average age
for women's first intercourse is 16.2, and for men is 15.7. See Melvin Zelnik & Farida K.
Shah, First Intercourse Among Young Americans, 15 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 64 (1983), cited in
Ruth Jones, Inequality from Gender-Neutral Laws: Why Must Male Victims of Statutory
Rape Pay Child Support for Children Resulting from their Victimization?, 36 GA. L. RE'V.
411 (2002).
68. See, e.g., PHILIHu G. ZIMBARDO & RICHARD D. GERRIG, PSYCHOLOGY AND LIFE(15th ed. 1998), cited in Susan S. Kuo, A Little Privacy Please: Should We Punish Parents
for Teenage Sex?, 89 Ky. L.J. 135 (2000-01).
69. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
70. See Zelnik & Shah, supra note 67.
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the same general age range.7' Consequently, Florida could argue that,
assuming Elizabeth has a constitutional right to sexual privacy, Florida
has not breached it.
Elizabeth could counter-argue that the very nature of sexual privacy
requires that the participant and not the State choose. For example,
Texas was not free to tell John Lawrence that he should have chosen a
female partner.72 Plausibly, there could be a difference with juveniles.
Given that juvenile rights are not normally equal to adult rights, the age
limit might be thought reasonable.
One reason the State might choose such an age limit is the likelihood
that much older people might exert undue influence on juveniles to give
up their unquestioned constitutional right to not have intercourse with
them. Furthermore, the likelihood of lasting harm coming from such an
encounter may be far greater than the harm coming from an encounter
with a teenager's peer. 73
Elizabeth could argue that the State's interest could be met more nar-
rowly. First, she would contend that the State could meet its objectives
by requiring a higher level of consent when teenagers are involved with
older people. For example, as opposed to merely demanding that "no"
means no,7 4 the state could require affirmative assent. A few jurisdic-
71. See Zimbardo & Gerrig, supra note 68. Certainly, several significant studies have
suggested that two of the primary justifications for statutory rape laws-increased teen
pregnancy and abusive/coercive relationships based on an imbalance of power-are mini-
mized when the partners are of a similar age. See, e.g., David J. Landry & Jacqueline
Darroch Forrest, How Old Are U.S. Fathers?, 27 FAM. PLAN. PEIRSP. 159, 160-61 (1995)
(noting 60% of 15- to 17-year-old mothers had a partner who was three or more years
older, half of whom were at least twenty years of age, and almost 20% of such mothers had
a partner six or more years older); Mike Males & Kenneth S.Y. Chew, The Ages of Fathers
in California Adolescent Births, 1993, 86 AM. J. Pun. HEALTH-! 565, 567 (1996) (reporting
study showing two-thirds of California school age mothers had partners whose average age
was more than four years older than their mother). Most famously, the Alan Guttmacher
Institute released its 1994 study Sex and America's Teenagers, indicating that 65% of U.S.
teen mothers had children by men who were twenty or older. See Alan Guttmacher Insti-
tute, Sex and America's Teenagers (1994) (cited in COCCA, supra note 24, at 96). Indeed.
this concern that older males were taking sexual advantage of young women and leaving
them pregnant (and on the welfare rolls) motivated a spate of laws in the mid- and late-
1990's that revitalized statutory rape prosecutions. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 261.5
(West 1995) California's Teenage Pregnancy Prevention Act of 1995. Compare with an
interesting case involving consensual sexual intercourse between a twelve-year-old victim
and a fourteen-year-old perpetrator where an Ohio court refused to uphold the charge of
rape. See In re Frederick. 622 N.E.2d 762, 765 (Ohio Misc. 2d 1993) (asserting that the
legislature could not have intended a perpetrator so close in age to be held accountable for
the crime of rape solely because of the age of the victim and amending the charge to find
perpetrator guilty of being an unruly child).
72. See generally Lawrence, 539 U.S. 558.
73. Indeed, one of the primary justifications for statutory rape laws has always been to
protect the young and vulnerable from more experienced adults who can be assumed to
have vastly superior economic, social, and physical power at their disposal. This power
imbalance obviously leaves the minor victim open to a degree of abuse unlike what they
may face from a similarly-aged partner.
74. See, e.g., SUSAN Es-rkcii, REAL RAPE, 80-97, 102 (1987) (proposing that rape law
be predicated on the notion that "'no" always be understood as an absolute denial).
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tions require this in rape cases generally, 75 but most do not.76
Although the question is close, the Court would probably say that lim-
iting Elizabeth's intimate choices to somebody under twenty-four until
such time as she reaches her eighteenth birthday is constitutional. If the
State had absolutely precluded her sexual expression, as a few states do,77
it should be held unconstitutional as more burdensome than necessary to
meet the State's legitimate interest. 78 But it did not, and so it should
probably be upheld as a reasonable limitation on Elizabeth's rights.
Of course, just as Arthur was unaware of Elizabeth's age, Elizabeth
was unaware of Arthur's age. Most likely, however, the Court would deal
with this under Arthur's personal constitutional claim, to which we now
turn.
B. ARTHUR'S CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM
There seems to be little question that Arthur was honestly and reasona-
bly mistaken about Elizabeth's age. I suppose that a cynical prosecutor
could argue that he was not mistaken, he just did not think about it at all.
Undoubtedly this is true in a sense. Just as Elizabeth did not know (or
care) whether Arthur was twenty-two, twenty-four, or twenty-six, Arthur
did not know (or care) whether Elizabeth was eighteen, nineteen, twenty,
or twenty-one. But he certainly did not think or imagine that an unusu-
ally sophisticated sophomore with a graduate student's understanding of
Shakespeare could be under eighteen; especially since she had her own
apartment off campus.
In most states, including Florida, 79 a mistake of age, no matter how
75. See State ex rel. v. M.T.S., 609 A.2d 1266, 1277 (N.J. 1992).
76. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Berkowitz, 641 A.2d 1161, 1104 (Pa. 1994).
77. See supra note 66.
78. 1 assume that the State's only legitimate interest is assuring itself that the consent
was given freely and that the experience is unlikely to cause lasting harm to the young
person involved. I assume that the Victorian notions of chastity that originally gave rise to
the concept of statutory rape would no longer qualify as a legitimate state interest. See
Gerald Leonard, Towards a Legal History of American Criminal Theory: Culture and Doc-
trine from Blackstone to the Model Penal Code, 6 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 691-96 (2003) (dis-
cussing the Victorian roots of statutory rape laws protecting a girl's chastity as a valuable
economic and moral good). Cf. Anne Coughlin, Sex and Guilt, 84 VA. L. Ri v. 1 (1998).
To the extent that the State is interested in preventing unwanted pregnancy and sexually-
transmitted diseases, that interest seems better-served by preventing sex between minors
and much older partners. See supra note 71. Of course, one could argue that the interest
would be better served by totally disallowing sex by those under eighteen. However, the
statistics do not indicate that minors who engage in sex with those of a similar age are any
more likely than the population as a whole to acquire sexually transmitted diseases or
unwanted pregnancy. See Abigail English & Catherine Teare, Statutory Rape Enforcement
and Child Abuse Reporting: Effects on Health Care Access for Adolescents, 50 DEPAUL L.
Rr'v. 827, 843-45 (2001) (arguing that statutory rape laws discourage young people from
contacting public health officials for fear of loss of their privacy, thus increasing their risk
of contracting STD's and of leaving such diseases untreated). But see Cocca, supra note 24,
at 93-129 (discussing the flaws in the popular argument that relationships between partners
of different ages are more likely to result in pregnancy and STD's that burden the state's
coffers).
79. See Simmons v. State, 10 So.2d 436, 438 (Fla. 1942); see also Hodge v. State, 866
So.2d 1270, 1272 (Fla. 2004).
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reasonable, is no defense.80 Various reasons and non-reasons are given
for this rule. The most prominent non-reason is: "The Legislature has
chosen to make this a strict liability crime." 81 Of those states that have
attempted reasons, the most common are (1) the law is necessary for the
protection of minors,8 2 and (2) the defendant knew that he was doing
something wrong.8 3 The fact that his wrong was greater than he believed
is no ground for exculpating him.s4
In 1964, in People v. Hernandez,85 the California Supreme Court began
a minority trend by holding that a reasonable mistake of age constitu-
ted a defense to statutory rape. In the court's view, it was unreason-
able for a man,8 6 who reasonably thought that his sex partner was over
eighteen, to be deemed a criminal.8 7 Conversely, the court thought it in-
appropriate to view each of the young women as victims. 88 A few
other courts have followed suit,89 though usually not on constitutional
80. See Simmons, 10 S.2d at 438.
81. See, e.g., State v. Yanez, 716 A.2d 759, 764 (R.I. 1998) (stating "The plain words
and meaning of § 11-37-8.1 prohibit the sexual penetration of an underaged person and
make no reference to the actor's state of mind, knowledge, or belief. In our opinion this
lack of a mens rea results not from negligent omission but from legislative design."). See
also State v. Searles, 621 A.2d 1281, 1283 (Vt. 1993); United States v. Ransom, 942 F.2d
775, 776 (10th Cir. 1991).
82. See Commonwealth v. Walker, 362 A.2d 227, 232 (Pa. 1976).
83. See State v. Jadowski, 680 N.W.2d 810, 812 (Wis. 2004); see also discussion infra
Part I1. A.
84. The genesis of this "lesser legal wrong" or "moral wrong" position is the old En-
glish case of Regina v. Prince, 2 L.R.-C.C.R. 154, 155 (Cr. Cas. Res. 1875), not technically a
statutory rape case. The reasoning has been invoked with some frequency in the United
States. See, e.g., State v. Stiffler, 788 P.2d 220, 221 (Idaho 1990); State v. Silva, 491 P.2d
1216, t217 (Haw. 1971).
85. 393 P.2d 673, 678 (Cal. 1964).
86. At that time, the California law was gender specific, providing for only female
"victims" and male perpetrators. See Michael M., 450 U.S. at 464. Today the California
law, like the laws of every state, is gender neutral. See COCCA, supra note 24 ("[Gender-
neutral] language had been imposed in every state by the year 2000."). See also COCCA,
supra note 24, at 74 (listing year-by-year the year of adoption of gender neutral language).
Although several states use masculine pronouns to describe statutory rape offenders, in a
way, this is probably meant to be gender neutral potentially read as non-neutral. See, e.g..
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 566.034 (1) (West 2004) (Missouri's statutory rape law, that reads, "A
person commits the crime of statutory rape in the second degree if being 21 years of age or
older, he has sexual intercourse with another person who is less than seventeen years of
age."). But see Tina M. Allen, Gender-Neutral Statutory Rape Laws: Legal Fictions Dis-
guised as Remedies to Male Child Exploitation, 80 U. DEr. MERCY L. REV. 111, 111-12
(2002) (arguing that statutory rape laws still fail to sufficiently protect boys from abuse).
87. See Hernandez, 393 P.2d at 677-78.
88. Id.
89. See, e.g., Perez v. State, 803 P.2d 249, 261 (N.M. 1990) (holding that defendant
should have been permitted to argue that he was reasonably mistaken about his underaged
partner's age). See also ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.445 (Michie 2000) (providing for mistake of
age defense if victim is at least thirteen years of age); CoLO. REV. STAT. § 18 (2004) (stat-
ing reasonable belief that victim is over eighteen is a defense if the victim is over fifteen
years old but is not a defense if victim is younger than fifteen); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-67
(2004) (allowing mistake of fact defense when victim is older than fourteen). Indeed, the
United States Congress has also created a mistake of age defense to statutory rape. See
Criminal Law and Procedure Technical Amendments Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-646,




But post-Lawrence, the landscape should change. In bygone days, we
could say to Arthur: "You knew that you were doing something wrong.
The fact that your wrong was greater than you anticipated will not avail
you. If you didn't want to take a chance, you could have abstained from
sexual intercourse entirely." Today, Arthur would answer: "But what I
believed I was doing was a constitutional right. Perhaps some people
may consider it immoral, but that doesn't matter. The nation's funda-
mental charter protects what I reasonably thought I was lawfully doing."
To be sure, not everything that the Constitution protects is universally
deemed moral. Many consider flag desecration to be immoral.9 t At least
a substantial minority of the country would say the same about abortion 92
or homosexual sodomy. 93 But those things, like fornication, 9 4 are consti-
tutionally protected. We now explore the consequences that follow from
that status.
The analogues that have engendered the most litigation are obscenity
and child pornography. In the leading case, Smith v. California,95 the
Court invalidated a California statute that imposed strict criminal liability
on a bookseller for selling an obscene book.9 6 The Court reasoned that if
a bookseller could be strictly liable for selling obscene books, he might
not sell a book until he had read it.97 Consequently, the public would be
deprived of constitutionally protected reading material as well as obscen-
ity.98 Thus, the law designed to restrict the sale of unprotected books
would also reduce the sale of constitutionally protected books. 99
In Hamling v. United States,l0 0 however, the Court indicated that so
long as the defendant was aware of the general character of the material,
it mattered not whether he personally knew that it was obscene.' 0t Of
course, this meant that some self-censorship was tolerable in order to
meaningfully enforce the statute, but absolute liability was not.10 2
That is probably, but not certainly, the rule in regard to child pornogra-
the federal crime of committing statutory rape "in the special maritime and territorial juris-
diction of the United States or in a Federal prison")).
90. But see State v. Guest, 583 P.2d 836, 837 (Alaska 1978) (holding that a mistake of
age defense must be read into the offense of statutory rape for such a law to pass constitu-
tional muster).
91. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 398 (1989) (holding that flag burning is pro-
tected speech).
92. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 13
(1973).
93. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 558.
94. See supra Part I.
95. 361 U.S. 147 (1959).
96. Id. at 155.
97. Id. at 153.
98. Id. at 154.
99. Id.
100. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
101. Id. at 120-21.
102. Id. at 123.
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phy. In United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc.,10 3 the Supreme Court
construed an ambiguous statute to require that a purveyor of child por-
nography know that at least one of the actors or actresses in a sexually-
explicit film is under eighteen.' 0 4 In the course of the opinion, the Court
suggested "that a statute completely bereft of a scienter requirement as to
the age of its performers would raise serious constitutional doubts."'
10 5
In an interesting opinion, Justices Scalia and Thomas disagreed. 10 6 In
their view, sexually-explicit material was either unprotected by the Con-
stitution or only marginally protected. 10 7 Consequently, as they saw it,
the right to distribute sexually explicit material required no constitutional
breathing room.' 08 In language highly relevant to the subject of this arti-
cle, Justice Scalia wrote: "It is no more unconstitutional to make persons
who knowingly deal in hardcore pornography criminally liable for the un-
derage character of their entertainers than it is to make men who engage
in consensual fornication criminally liable (in statutory rape) for the un-
derage character of their partners."t 0 9
Of course, at the time Justice Scalia wrote these words, Lawrence had
not yet been decided and fornication was arguably not yet constitution-
ally protected." 0 Nevertheless, one could argue that the right to fornica-
tion does not require the same breathing room as the right to free speech.
Justice Scalia's point was two-fold. First, he argued that, to the extent
that sexually-explicit speech was protected by the Constitution, it re-
quired less breathing room than other speech."' Second, he argued that
the nature of the sexually-explicit film industry was such that a strict lia-
bility age limitation law would have no significant deterrent effect."
12
By that reasoning, one could argue that fornication, even as a constitu-
tional right, does not need as much breathing room as free speech. Free
speech benefits society generally, whereas fornication only benefits the
immediate actors. So, in our hypothetical problem, only Arthur and Eliz-
abeth were benefited by the act that resulted in Arthur's conviction. By
way of contrast, assume that Arthur and Elizabeth, inspired by their ex-
perience, had written: A Modern Day Romeo and Juliet. Assume further
that a bookstore owner, faced with the California statute, invalidated in
Smith, refused to stock the book because he had not read it. Not only
would Arthur, Elizabeth, and the bookstore owner's rights be compro-
103. 513 U.S. 64 (1994).
104. Id. at 79.
105. Id. at 78.
106. Id. at 80.
107. Id. at 84.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 85.
110. Although it could be argued that some prior decisions had plainly suggested the
existence of such a right, it is doubtful that Justice Scalia, who dissented in Lawrence, in
part because he was concerned with the creation of such a right by the decision, would
have concurred.
111. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 84.
112. Id. at 85.
2005]
SMU LAW REVIEW
mised, but the entire potential readership of the community would be
compromised because they would be unable to purchase the book. So. it
is possible to argue the right to fornication need not be treated with the
same solicitude as the right to free speech.
Furthermore, a person desirous of sexual intercourse with a willing
partner is less likely to be deterred by a strict liability statutory rape law
than a bookseller is by a strict liability determination of obscenity. One
particular book is not that important to a bookseller, and if it is a poten-
tial source of criminal liability, the seller is likely to simply eschew the
opportunity to sell by not stocking the book. 1 3 A fornicator in the pri-
vacy of his home, on the other hand, aware of the difficulty of detection,
is more likely to assume the extremely small risk that his apparently adult
partner may turn out to be a juvenile.
Notwithstanding these distinctions, I contend that Arthur should be en-
titled to raise reasonable mistake of age as a matter of constitutional
right. Professor Alan Michaels has recently argued persuasively that
when one is non-negligently exercising a constitutional right, as opposed
to merely a statutory right, the Constitution demands that he have a de-
fense." 4 So, under this theory, if one non-negligently sells liquor to a
minor, she can be punished even if she took every reasonable precaution
to ascertain the minor's true age but was deceived by his phony identifi-
cation card. This is justified because the State could have forbidden her
to sell alcohol. So, by accepting the State's permission to sell, which the
State was not constitutionally obligated to grant, the seller assumes the
risk of improperly ascertaining someone's age.
Pre-Lawrence, one could have said the same for fornication. But now
that the State cannot punish the intended act, Professor Michaels' theory
would suggest that the State cannot punish the unintended, non-negligent
result of statutory rape." 5
Whether or not Michaels' theory should be universally adopted, I
would clearly apply it here. The hallmark of Justice Kennedy's Lawrence
opinion suggests that adults should feel safe in their exercise of sexual
privacy in their homes.t1 6 The possibility of an apparent adult being a
juvenile is extremely small, but then so was the possibility of John Law-
rence and Tyrone Garner being discovered in their intimate act. Had
Garner been a juvenile, contrary to all outward manifestations, Lawrence
would have been no more deserving of punishment than he was in the
actual case. I do not deny that harm can and should be relevant to the
113. Cf., Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 71 (1963) (overturning a Rhode Island
law which created a Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth empowered to seek out
and prosecute booksellers who offered "objectionable" books because of its impact on
booksellers).
114. See Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional Innocence, 112 HARV. L. REv. 829 (1999).
115. See id.
116. See generally Lawrence, 593 U.S. at 558.
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overall assessment of one's criminal liability,' ' 7 but, at a constitutional
minimum, his culpability should be something more than his non-negli-
gent exercise of a constitutional right.
Another analogy worth pursuing is that of producers, as opposed to
sellers, of sexually-explicit films. Although the Supreme Court has yet to
rule on the state of mind necessary to convict a producer of a film con-
taining a minor participating in sexually-explicit conduct, it has hinted
that the state of mind may be less than that of the seller of the mate-
rial."-" In a rather enigmatic footnote in X-Citement Video, the Court
noted "that producers are more conveniently able to ascertain the age of
performers [than sellers]. It thus makes sense to impose the risk of error
on producers."1 19
This conclusion was predicated on United States District Court for the
Central District Court of California, °20 where Judge Alexander Kozinski,
for the Ninth Circuit, held that the First Amendment precludes strict lia-
bility for the producer of a non-obscene sexually-explicit film with a child
actress.1 21 At the same time, the court held that the First Amendment
could be satisfied by allowing a conviction, unless the producer could
prove "by clear and convincing evidence, that he did not know, and could
not reasonably have learned, that the actor or actress was under eighteen
years of age." 122
On the surface, Judge Kozinski's opinion appears internally inconsis-
tent. On the one hand, he relies on Smith v. California for the proposi-
tion that strict liability in regard to the age of the actress is forbidden.1 23
On the other hand, he places an extreme burden on the producer that
Smith would not have tolerated.124 Indeed, the bookseller in Smith
would have been convicted under the United States District Court stan-
dard. Smith could have avoided liability by examining all of his inven-
tory. However, the Smith Court thought that this was an intolerable
burden under the First Amendment. 25
Judge Kozinski's explanation for this dichotomy is the ability of pro-
ducers to meet the subjects face to face and insist on adequate identifica-
tion. 126 Thus, on the facts before the court where a young actress, Traci
Lords, had produced a vast amount of false identification,1 27 coupled with
117. See Arnold H. Loewy, Culpability, Dangerousness, and Harm: Balancing the Fac-
tors on Which Our Criminal Law is Predicated, 66 N.C. L. RExV. 283 (1988).
118. X-Citement Video, 513 U.S. at 77 n.5 (citing United States v. United States Dist.
Ct. for the Cent. Dist. of Ca., 858 F.2d 534, 543 n.6 (9th Cir. 1988)).
119. Id.
120. 858 F.2d at 540.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 543.
123. Id. at 540. See generally Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959); see also supra
note 95 and accompanying text.
124. 858 F.2d at 543.
125. 361 U.S. at 153 (quoting King v. Ewart 25 N.Z.L.R. 709, 729).
126. 858 F.2d at 540.
127. See TRACi LORD)S, UNDIERNIAIH IT ALL 56 (2003) (describing how she used a
borrowed birth certificate to obtain a driver's license indicating that she was of age and
2005]
SMU LAW REVIEW
both an adult appearance and sexual savoire-faire, Judge Kozinski
thought that the defense would be available. 28 Otherwise, it would
not. 1
29
Obviously, on this reasoning, Arthur would not have a defense. He
could have done a lot more to have learned Elizabeth's age. First, he
could have asked her. Second, if she had said she was eighteen, 130 he
could have asked for her birthdate, or better yet, a picture identification
card. He did none of these things, but simply assumed (or perhaps never
thought about whether) she was of age.
Nevertheless, I would contend that even if United States District Court
was correctly decided, Arthur should have a defense. Hiring an actress to
perform in a sexually-explicit movie, though brigaded with First Amend-
ment overtones, is essentially a commercial transaction. It is not uncom-
mon for child labor laws, which was the essence of the law in United
States District Court, 31 to be predicated on strict liability.132 So, Judge
Kozinski essentially concluded that because of the First Amendment
overtones of the case, strict liability was not appropriate. 13 3 On the other
hand, because of the employer/employee nature of the transaction, only
the most minimal culpability was required.134
Arthur's case is different for two reasons. First, what is reasonable in
the employer/employee relationship is not necessarily reasonable in a so-
cial setting. A movie producer expects to have a degree of regulation
and, especially when making a sexually-explicit film, would expect to use
extraordinary care to avoid hiring an underage actress. Ordinary care
would seem far more appropriate in the social situation where part of the
Lawrence right is the right to be free of excessive government snooping.
how she also obtained other identification, including a U.S. passport using the same birth
certificate).
128. 858 F.2d at 540.
129. See Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes, 78
CORN[LL L. REv. 401, 462 (1993) (supporting Judge Kozinski's reasoning).
130. A likely answer from one who is seventeen years and ten months old. At that age
it is not uncommon for even honest, ethical people to round up to the nearest birthday,
especially when the speaker does not realize that a slightly inaccurate answer may have
tremendous legal ramifications.
131. See Arnold H. Loewy, Obscenity, Pornography, and First Amendment Theory, 2
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 471, 480 (1993).
132. See, e.g., Krutlies v. Bulls Head Coal Co., 94 A. 459, 461-62 (Pa. 1915) (holding
that where an underaged coal breaker lied about his age, the employer is still liable despite
reasonable efforts to ascertain the employee's age). Cf. United States v. Frazier, 123 F.3d
409, 419 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that a drug dealer need not know that his employee is a
minor to be subject to enhanced penalties under 21 U.S.C. § 861(a)(1)). But see 29 C.F.R.
§ 570.5 (establishing and describing the certification system administered by the Chief of
the Children's Bureau to insure that underaged workers are not employed illegally). Al-
though using child labor remains a "strict liability" offense in the sense that an employer
can be found liable regardless of intent or willfulness, see, e.g., Chao v. Videotape, Inc., 196
F. Supp. 2d 281, 295 (E.D.N.Y. 2002), this certification system protects employers who may
be fooled by dishonest employees in a way that someone accused of statutory rape is not
protected.
33. 858 F.2d at 540.
134. Id. at 543.
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Second, the potential harm to the minor is far greater in the United
States District Court situation. A film of a minor engaging in sex acts with
herself or others is a permanent public record, available to anyone for the
price of admission to the movie. To put it mildly, few, if any, psycholo-
gists would argue that allowing a juvenile to make such a choice at an
incompletely mature age is a good thing.' 35 A seventeen year old's pri-
vate, consensual sexual activity will seldom have as much potential for
future harm as a movie of such activity and, indeed, will sometimes ar-
guably be constitutionally protected in its own right.' 36 Even when it is
not, there is at least a reasonable possibility that it will be a good thing for
the "victim. 1 3 7 And, where not an unmitigated good, it may at least be a
bittersweet experience in which the harm fails to approach the harm of an
appearance in an X-rated movie.' 38
So, I would conclude that, at a minimum under Lawrence, a defendant
should have a constitutional defense to statutory rape whenever he can
establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a reasonable person
would have believed that his perspective sex partner had reached the age
of consent. Thus, Arthur's constitutional defense should prevail.
III. SOME SPECIFIC CASES
A. JADOWSKI
In State v. Jadowski,139 decided nearly a full year after Lawrence,140 the
Wisconsin Supreme Court, without so much as mentioning Lawrence, up-
held a statutory rape conviction where the fifteen year old "victim" used
what appeared to be a State-issued identification card, establishing her
age as nineteen. 41 She also held herself out to others as nineteen, and
maintained, in the defendant's presence, that she was old enough to be an
exotic dancer.142
135. Obviously, there is no debate that child pornography is not constitutionally pro-
tected. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982); Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S.
103, 107 (1990). Psychological findings about harm to minors caused by appearing in child
pornography, which buttress these cases and the laws that they upheld, have been legion.
See, e.g., M. Silbert, The Effects on Juveniles of Being Used For Prostitution and Pornogra-
phy 23 (1986), appended to E. Mulvey & J. Haugaard, Report of the Surgeon General's
Workshop on Pornography and Public Health (1986) (describing how recordings of their
sexual activity leave victims of child pornography, even many years after the fact, feeling
that they "have lost any sense of control over their lives and have accepted feeling trapped
and victimized").
136. See discussion infra Part II.A.
137. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
138. Consider the classic country song "Strawberry Wine" that retells the composer's
first sexual experience at age seventeen. Though the author uses the term "bittersweet,"
the listener gets the distinct impression that the sweet outweighed the bitter. See Deanna
Carter, Strawberry Wine, on Dn3 I SHAVE My LEGS FoR THIS (Capitol Records 1996).
139. 680 N.W.2d 810 (Wis. 2004).
140. Lawrence was decided on June 26, 2003. Jadowski was decided on June 10, 2004.
141. 680 N.W.2d at 823.
142. Id. at 813-14.
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The court held first that the statute, properly construed, did not allow
for a defense based on either the defendant's reasonable mistake of fact
or the victim's perpetrating a fraud on him by virtue of her false identifi-
cation. 143 Second, the court held that nothing in the Due Process Clause
precluded application of the statutory rape law to Todd Jadowski.t 44
Interestingly, in regard to the statutory construction argument, Jadow-
ski relied on United States District Court where, you will recall, the pro-
ducers of a sexually-explicit film were permitted to rely on similar
deception by actress Traci Lords.t 45 The Jadowski court concluded that
United States District Court was not relevant stating: "The present case is
not a First Amendment case and it is not necessary for the court to read
any language into these statutes to preserve their constitutionality." 146
Obviously, if the court had recognized the relevance of Lawrence, the
question would have been different and more complex. We now turn to
an analysis of whether the answer would have been different as well.
One of the issues deals with the difficulty of ascertaining minority. It is
common knowledge, repeated in several opinions, 147 that it is often very
difficult to ascertain age.148 Indeed, the Jadowski court specifically recog-
nized the difficulty of ascertaining age and used that as an argument
against allowing a reasonable mistake of age to be a defense. 149 As the
court put it: "[E]ngrafting the defendant's proposed defense onto the
statute undermines the policy of protecting minors from sexual abuse and
would raise practical law enforcement problems. Age is difficult to ascer-
tain and actors could often reasonably claim that they believed their vic-
tims were adults."'150
One would have thought that the difficulty in ascertaining age would
have cut in the other direction. Certainly, the First Amendment cases,
particularly X-Citement Video, suggest that the more difficult it is to as-
certain age, the stronger the argument for a constitutional defense.15'
And one of the hallmarks of Justice Kennedy's libertarian Lawrence
opinion was the assurance that adults sleeping together in private need
143. Id. at 818-19.
144. Id. at 823.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 120-22.
146. 680 N.W.2d at 816 n.15.
147. See, e.g., James P. Semmens & F. Jane Semmins, Physiological Growth and Emo-
tional Adjustment of Adolescent Girls, cited in THE ADOLESCENT EXPERIENCE: A COUN-
SEI NG GUIDE TO SOCIAL AND SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 50-51 (James P. Semmins & Kermit E.
Krantz eds., 1970) (describing the physical developments that occur during adolescence as
a highly individual process, particularly in the United States with the mixing of races,
ethnicities, and regional backgrounds). Indeed, in a case decided this term, Justice
O'Connor (concurring) remarked "it is difficult to expect police to recognize that a suspect
is a juvenile when he is so close to the age of majority ... 17 1/2 -year-olds vary widely in
their reactions to police questioning, and many can be expected to behave as adults." Yar-
borough v. Alverado, 124 S. Ct. 2140, 2140, 2152 (2004).
148. For what it is worth, the last time I allowed a professional age guesser at an amuse-
ment park to guess my age, he underestimated my age by twelve years.
149. 680 N.W.2d at 817.
150. Id.
151. 513 U.S. at 72 n.2.
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not fear governmental intrusion. 52 Obviously to the extent that individ-
uals cannot safely rely on appearances, that liberty is compromised.
We should not underestimate the difficulty in ascertaining age. While I
like to think that the deceptions perpetrated by Traci Lords and the
Jadowski victim are relatively rare, many twenty year olds appear to be
fifteen and vice-versa. Certainly a twenty year old with proper identifica-
tion should not have her right to sexual intimacy impaired because her
chosen partner fears intimacy lest her identification prove inaccurate.
In one respect, Jadowski is a weaker case for the defendant than the
Arthur and Elizabeth hypothetical. Unlike the Florida statute discussed
in that case, Wisconsin makes the age of consent sixteen.153 Conse-
quently, if my argument has been correct thus far, she has no constitu-
tional right to sexual intimacy. Thus, Jadowski's argument is based
entirely on mistake and not at all on his victim's constitutional right to
sexual intimacy.
On the other hand, his reasonable belief was that she was nineteen, an
adult. Had he believed that she were sixteen or seventeen, a different
question would be raised.t 54 Because he reasonably believed that she was
nineteen, the fact that the statute only protects youngsters under sixteen
is quite beside the point. By way of analogy consider two sellers of ob-
scene books. Seller A sells a book that is clearly obscene, but the con-
tents of the book were never called to his attention. Seller B sells a book
that is marginally obscene, but the seller was aware of its contents.
Under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, Seller A is not guilty, but
Seller B is.'55 Similarly, a statutory rape defendant's liability should be
measured not by the actual youth of the victim, but by the purity of the
defendant's heart. Thus, a thirty-five year old defendant 56 should have a
defense when he is intimate with a fifteen year old partner that he reason-
ably believes to be nineteen, but a similarly situated defendant should not
have a constitutional defense when he has sex with a seventeen year old
who he has no reason to believe is older. 157
B. WALKER
In Walker v. State, twenty-nine year old William Walker and fifteen
year old runaway Carla Peterkin met while both were employed at Weis
Supermarket in Baltimore.15 8 Carla initially informed William that she
152. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
153. 680 N.W.2d at 817.
154. See discussion infra Part III.B.
155. Compare Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959), with Hamling v. United
States, 418 U.S. 87, 121-24 (1974).
156. Jadowski was thirty-five.
157. Of course in Wisconsin, he would have a statutory defense because Wisconsin does
not punish sex with those sixteen and over. On the other hand, in Florida, he could be
convicted of a serious felony for which he would lack a constitutional defense. See FI-A.
STA-r. ANN. § 794.05 (West 2004). The extent to which he would have a constitutional
defense in a state with a lower age of consent is discussed infra Part 1I1.B.
158. 768 A.2d 631, 632 (Md. 2001).
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was nineteen years of age. 159 At some point, they moved in together and
began a consensual sexual relationship. 60 At some point during the rela-
tionship, Carla admitted that she was only seventeen.' 6t William also
knew that Weis Supermarket would not hire anybody under seventeen. 162
Indeed, Carla's application did state that she was seventeen, although
William had not seen it.163 Subsequently, a policeman found Carla, re-
turned her to her father, and the defendant was prosecuted. 164 The Ma-
ryland Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction.' 65
Because Walker was decided before Lawrence, the court obviously did
not invoke that case. 166 Nevertheless, the Walker issue is appropriate for
analysis in a post-Lawrence world. One issue that Walker presents differ-
ent from Jadowski is the apparent age of the "victim." In Jadowski, at all
relevant times, the defendant believed that his partner was nineteen.' 67
In Walker, for at least some of the relationship, William believed that
Carla was seventeen.' 68
We have already determined that to the extent a seventeen year old has
a constitutional right to sexual intimacy with another that right can be
limited to relations with someone within a few years of her age. 169 Con-
sequently, it seems clear that had the facts been as William believed them
to be, he and Carla would not have had a constitutional right to sexual
intimacy with each other. Thus, the State can argue that because William
did not believe that he was exercising a constitutional right, Lawrence
offers no protection and the classic strict liability model returns.
There is some force to this argument. The State after all could have
entirely forbidden sex between a twenty-nine year old and a seventeen
year old. Therefore, nothing should preclude it from the less onerous
requirement that if the twenty-nine year old chooses to engage in such
behavior, he does so at his peril. After all, he does know that Carla lied
about her age at least once. That does seem to be the theory supporting
much strict liability legislation, and certainly appears to comport with
Professor Michaels' "Constitutional Innocence" theory.1 70
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. The language of the opinion is somewhat ambiguous on this point, but the textual
statement is a reasonable inference one could draw from the various statements admitted
as agreed facts. Id. In any event, for purposes of analysis, I will assume this to be a correct




165. Id. at 638.
166. In fact, the court referred to an earlier decision, Owens v. State, 724 A.2d 43 (Md.
1999) in which the court relied on Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) for the proposi-
tion that fornication was not a constitutional right.
167. Jadowski, 680 N.W.2d at 813-14.
168. 768 A.2d at 632.
169. See supra Part II.A.
170. See supra note 114.
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Nevertheless. I believe that William should have a constitutional de-
fense. In regard to the initial lie (that she was nineteen), William had
nothing other than her word. In regard to her claim to being seventeen,
he does know that the supermarket where they both work will not hire
anyone under seventeen. Although, from his perspective, it is theoreti-
cally possible that she lied to the supermarket (which in fact she did) that
is not likely what most people would reasonably believe. One would es-
pecially assume that she was at least seventeen because she was appar-
ently on her own with no parental supervision.17'
As to whether strict liability is appropriate when the State allows more
than the Constitution requires, I would argue that in this context it is not.
William has a constitutional right to sexual intimacy. Although he
knows1 72 that this right is limited to sex with adults, he does not know
what constitutes an adult as a matter of constitutional law.t 73 Conse-
quently, his most appropriate source is the Maryland Penal Code which
provides various penalties for certain sex acts between parties, one of
whom is under sixteen, and the other of whom is substantially older. It
provides no penalty nor prohibition when both parties are at least six-
teen.174 Thus, William's most natural conclusion is that Maryland deems
sixteen the age of adulthood for purposes of sexual intimacy.
So, from William's perspective, the United States Constitution protects
consensual sex with another adult. Maryland's statute appears to define
adulthood for this purpose as sixteen.175 He has been told at different
times that Carla is seventeen and nineteen. Does it make any sense for
him to attempt to clarify the ambiguity? Either way, the law of Maryland
permits their living arrangement, complete with its sexual component.
Only the most pedantic constitutionalist would worry about which of the
two lawful ages she was. Consequently, William should be able to invoke
the constitutional defense proposed in this essay.
IV. CONCLUSION
Statutory rape is a serious crime that under some circumstances de-
serves substantial punishment. Furthermore, the mistake of age defense
has been claimed by some reprobates for whom any constitutionally al-
171. Plausibly, if she looked young, that would undercut the reasonableness of his be-
lief. However, I can recall that at age fourteen at a camp, a female introduced herself to me
who appeared to be my age or younger. It turned out that she was a nineteen year old,
married counselor.
172. More accurately, he is presumed to know.
173. Lawrence did not say, and my prior analysis is not even law yet, much less some-
thing about which William Walker should be expected to be aware.
174. See Walker, 768 A.2d at 637 chart (spelling out the criminal/non-criminal character
of sexual relations between two partners of various ages and making it clear that sexual





lowable punishment would seem too kind. 176 Nevertheless, there are
those for whom the defense is highly appropriate. The hypothetical Ar-
thur Brown and the all too real Todd Jadowski and William Walker be-
long in that latter category.
They may not even be the most extreme. Imagine a twenty-four year
old man or woman sitting at a bar. An exquisitely attractive opposite (or
same) sex person sits down next to him or her, orders a drink, which is
served after the bartender is satisfied by the patron's state-issued picture
identification card. Our protagonist, enthralled by his/her neighbor's at-
tractiveness, invites him/her to spend the evening with him/her. The eve-
ning culminates in a sex act between the two.
Later, it is learned that the sex partner's identification card was phony
and that his/her real age is fifteen. 77 Ironically, under these circum-
stances, some states would excuse the bar tender who relied on the state-
issued identification card,1 78 notwithstanding the traditional strict liability
nature of this crime. Yet, many of these same states would not afford a
defense to our protagonist, whose very reasonable mistake could render
him/her a convicted felon. 179
Lawrence v. Texas was a clarion call for government to stay out of peo-
ple's private bedrooms. At the same time, from the citizen's perspective,
he or she was assured freedom from governmental intrusion so long as
his/her sex partner was an adult. Like most constitutional rights, this one
needs breathing room. If an individual knows that however careful he/
she is, one blameless mistake could render him/her a branded-for-life sex
criminal, he/she is in the same position that a pre-Lawrence homosexual
was in. He/she knows that it is highly unlikely that engaging in a particu-
lar sex act will result in criminal liability, but there is always that fear that
it could happen.
If the need to make statutory rape a strict liability offense were over-
whelming, perhaps there would be a reason to limit the breathing room
Lawrence needs to fulfill its promise to the populace of individual sexual
autonomy. However, there is no such overwhelming need. There is no
evidence that those states that allow reasonable mistake of age as a de-
fense have fewer statutory rape prosecutions or a significantly higher ac-
quittal rate.
176. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Miller, 432 N.E.2d 463 (Mass. 1982) (detailing events
where the defendant had sexual intercourse with a fifteen year old girl, took several nude
pictures of her, and used threats to expose their relationship to her parents and to circulate
those pictures in order to extort money from her).
177. Compare this to Traci Lords phony state-issued identification cards that were good
enough to get her work in several sexually-explicit movies and magazines. See supra note
127.
178. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340A.503(6) (West 2004) (providing a defense if the
minor provides a state-issued photo identification card).
179. For example, in Maryland the courts have made it clear that a reasonable mistake
of age can be a defense for selling alcohol to minors. See Haskin v. State, 131 A.2d 282
(Md. 1957)). Meanwhile, no mistake of age defense exists for statutory rape. See Garnett
v. State, 632 A.2d 797, 804 (Md. 1993). See also Walker, 768 A.2d at 631.
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For years, commentators have urged allowing reasonable mistake of
age as a defense to statutory rape.I 8° Some states have joined in the
call.18t Most have not. Now that fornication has moved from a petty soci-
etal annoyance to a protected constitutional right, it is again time to re-
think statutory rape. This time in the shadow of the Constitution.
180. See, e.g., Catherine L. Carpenter, On Statutory Rape, Strict Liability, and the Public
Welfare Offense Model, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 313 (2003); Larry W. Meyers, Reasonable Mis-
take of Age: A Needed Defense to Statutory Rape, 64 MIcH. L. REV. 105 (1965); Michelle
Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex with Minors: Defining a Role for Statutory Rape, 48
BUFF. L. REv. 703 (2000); Benjamin L. Reiss, Alaska's Mens Rca Requirements for Statu-
tory Rape, 9 ALASKA L. REV. 377 (1992).
181. See supra note 89.
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